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In this paper, we set out to examine an efficient fiscal-policy framework for a monetary union. We 
illustrate that fiscal policy’s bias toward budget deficit only temporarily ceased at the end of the 20
th cen-
tury as European countries endeavored to qualify for euro-zone membership, which compelled strict 
limits on budgetary deficits. We then explore which mechanisms might instill a sense of fiscal disciple in 
governments.  We  find  that  most  mechanisms  suffer  from  the  incentive-incompatible  setup  whereby 
governments restrict their own fiscal-policy freedom. We argue that even multilateral fiscal rules, such as 
the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, suffer from the same endogeneity flaw. Consequently, we argue that 
a  fiscal rule must incorporate an external authority that would impartially assess fiscal-policy deve-
lopments. Using U.S. debt and bond-market data at the state level, we show that financial markets re-
present a good candidate as, vis-à-vis the American states, they do differentiate state debt according to 
the level of debt. We thus argue for a fiscal institution – what we call the Fiscal Sustainability Council– 
that would actively bring financial markets into the fiscal-policy process, and we explain the technique 
whereby this could be effected. 
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I used to think if there were re-incarnation I wanted to come back as the pre-
sident or the pope… But now I want to come back as the bond market. You 
can intimidate everybody. 
James Carville 
Former chief strategist to U.S. President Bill Clinton 
1. Introduction 
Fiscal policy – the levels of government taxes and expenditures – remains the most intri-
guing economic policy issue early in the 21st century. While the 1990s saw a considerable con-
solidation of fiscal positions in most countries, the new century has been marked by rapidly 
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deteriorating fiscal positions in most developed countries. This development is accompanied by 
the flouting of fiscal rules by many European governments, chiefly the multilateral stability and 
growth pact (SGP), as enacted in 1997 by the European Union (EU) toward European Monetary 
Union (EMU). 
We focus on fiscal policy mainly in two regards. First, the overall fiscal policy of many 
countries appears to be unsustainable at present. Radical policy change seems unavoidable as 
most industrialized-country populations undergo profound demographic aging, which will re-
quire ever-higher levels of public spending on health care, pensions, and other social-security pro-
grams. Second, fiscal policy has a central role in multilateral monetary unions, wherein govern-
ments relinquish their monetary-policy capacity. The resulting increased need for fiscal-policy 
flexibility is, however, largely constrained by the apparent necessity to coordinate fiscal policies 
in consort. 
In the European context, many economists have sharply criticized the makeup, logic, 
and workings of the SGP within the EMU. Many have argued that it is backward-looking; that it 
might constrain fiscal policy when it is most needed as independent monetary policy of member 
states was conveyed to European Central Bank; that the union-wide reference values (i.e., the con-
straints) of 3 percent of public deficit and 60 percent of public debt (respective to GDP) are, in 
effect, arbitrary that the pact is arbitrarily enforced; that it will cause deficit-spending govern-
ments  in  the  face  of  the  pact’s  penalty-imposing  “excessive  deficit  procedure,”  to  sacrifice 
investment spending; that its one-size-fits-all nature is not suitable for Europe, which is anything 
but an optimum common-currency area; and, most lately, that it is totally inappropriate for new 
(and anticipated) EU member states. 
In this paper we analyze the reasons, consequences, and potential rules concerning the li-
mitation of excessive fiscal deficits in the context of monetary union. We discuss recent fiscal- 
-policy developments in the EU. We argue that the fiscal worsening that has transpired over 
2002–2004 has deeper roots than just a cyclical development. We analyze attempts to restrain 
fiscal-policy arbitrariness through a fiscal rule. We show that many such attempts suffer from 
low credibility and from incentive incompatibility. In that regard, the all-but-formal demise of 
the SGP is certainly a point in our case. 
We then look for alternative ways how to safeguard and support sound fiscal policy. We 
argue that an external authority, one that would regularly assess fiscal-policy developments, is 
needed. We argue that financial markets could play an active role in a new fiscal setup. Using 
a large panel data from the United States, we show that, there, fiscally more responsible states 
achieve lower interest rates when they sell their debt on financial markets. 
Finally, we attempt to formulate a proposal for the introduction of a new, European 
fiscal  authority  –  a  Fiscal  Sustainability  Council  (FSC)  –  that  would  have  the  authority  to 
prescribe annual deficits (or surpluses) to individual countries and that would report to the Euro-
pean Parliament, and perhaps more importantly, that would inform and guide financial markets 
as to which country’s fiscal policies are sustainable and which are not. In order to be most 
effective, the Council would be responsible for rolling over a substantial amount of the go-
vernment bonds of each member country. By doing so, the Council would be able to guide 
markets  more  precisely,  as  it  would  be  re-selling  government  bonds  on  an  annual  basis.  It 
would, thus, be in regular contact with financial markets and would be able to communicate to 
them its assessment of various national fiscal policies. 
We believe that our suggestion would allow a beneficial separation of the distributive 
(political)  and  the  stabilizing  (technocratic)  roles  of  fiscal  policy.  It  would  also  cultivate 
relations  with  financial  markets  and  their  comprehension  of  fiscal-policy  sustainability.  By 
doing so, the FSC would better facilitate the application of the EU’s common currency and 
would also prevent future fiscal crises. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, we review the arguments and empirical support 
for  the  hypothesis  of  a  deficit  bias  in  government  policies.  In  the  second  part,  we  analyze 
existing  fiscal  regimes  and  reveal  their  inadequacies.  The  third  part  explains  why  financial AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  34
markets may be useful toward establishing a fiscal rule, and the fourth part supports our concept 
with an empirical analysis of market efficiency in the U.S. bond market. Finally, we propose a mo-
dified fiscal-institution framework for the European Union, relying on an independent authority, 
the FSC, that would set appropriate deficit limits for EU countries using forward-looking pa-
rameters aimed at securing sustainable levels of explicit and implicit governmental debt. We 
also discuss the advantages and the possible pitfalls of such a proposal. 
2. Are Governments Biased toward Deficit Spending? 
The concept of persistently increasing government spending and an expansive public 
sector within the democratic process was first proposed by Buchanan and Wagner (1977). They 
identified a so called fiscal-illusion effect, which stems from the fact that during the budget 
process politicians do not fully internalize the costs associated with rising revenues needed to 
finance public activities. Therefore, politicians constantly overestimate the benefits associated 
with public activities and persistently undervalue the costs associated with increasing taxes. 
This, possibly non-intentional, aspect can be exacerbated by the deliberate use of public funds 
for private benefits, as shown in Becker (1983) or by budget-maximizing effort of public bureau-
crats, as analyzed in Niskanen (1968). 
Deficit bias, stemming from the increased need for public funds of a spending-biased 
government, stems from two factors. One is that current voters evaluate costs associated with 
increased taxes differently from the costs associated with higher government deficits. While in-
creased taxes directly lower taxpayers’ disposable incomes, government deficits are associated 
with costs such as higher inflation or higher public debt risk premium in other words, while 
the costs of taxes are real and immediate, the costs associated with deficits are notional and 
deferred (to when the responsible government is no longer in office). 
The second factor is that during the budget process the interests of future taxpayers are 
not properly represented. In fact, the future (largely unborn) generation cannot possibly have 
a voice when it comes to decisions of how to finance, current spending. Therefore, politicians 
defer many costs to the future, which creates a deficit bias. 
This story is clearly consistent with the expanding public sector, rising debt levels, and 
the rising deficits of most developed countries in the second half of the twentieth century. While 
the public sector grew steadily, as Wyplosz (2005) notes, taxes tottered behind, which meant 
rising  deficits  and  public  debts.  The  contemporary  European  fiscal  position  illustrates  this. 
Indeed, three of the fifteen “old” EU members (i.e., pre-2004 members) had debts in excess of 
100 percent of their respective GDPs in 2003 (Italy, Belgium, and Greece).
1 Indeed, as our 
analysis in the next chapter shows, many European governments returned to aggressive deficit 
spending  immediately  after  fulfilling  the  entry  criteria  for  the  EMU.  Such  fiscal-policy 
development illustrates the need for an external anchor. 
3. The Fiscal Positions of Old and New EU Members 
The new millennium has, so far, seen a steady worsening of the fiscal stance of most 
developed countries. EMU members’ recently found sense of fiscal restraint dissipated follow-
ing euro-zone entry, and euro-zone ledgers are now awash in red ink. The unweighted average 
of the deficit-to-GDP ratio of the old EU members is highly illustrative. From -5.1 percent of 
GDP in 1995, the average deficit declined to -0.7 percent of GDP in 1999, the year of the final 
fixing of exchange rates vis-à-vis the still non-cash euro, and eventually reached 1.0 percent of 
GDP  in  2000.
2  The  average  deficit  ratio  subsequently  declined  in  the  face  of  unfavorable 
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economic development, to -2.6 percent of GDP in 2003, and is expected to remain around this 
value for the next two years.
3 Truly, the envisaged position of “close to [a] budget balance or in 
surplus” is yet to materialize. 
Transition-economy countries, on the other hand, have always been a little different. 
They began the 1990s with high levels of public spending, highly distortive and arbitrary tax 
systems, and radical economic reconfiguration. The fiscal pressures that resulted from this mix 
were enormous and most transition countries, sooner or later, experienced severe fiscal pro-
blems. As a group, however, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries managed to cut 
public debt from more than 100 percent of GDP in 1992 to less than 60 percent in 2002. The rea-
sons for this development are numerous. Governments of CEE countries received considerable 
amount of funds from large-scale asset privatization; "non-standard" accounting practices and 
vaguely defined data-gathering methodology might also have improved the picture; and positive 
development might have been facilitated by special events, such as, for example, some generous 
debt underwriting in the case of Poland, and fiscal consolidation in Russia powered by high oil 
prices. 
Recent trends among transition countries are more worrisome, however. The ten coun-
tries that joined the European Union in May 2004 – Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – recorded public deficits, on average, 
of -3.2 percent of GDP in 2000 and of -5.7 percent in 2003. Deficits are expected to decrease 
(the European Commission‘s forecast is of -4.2 percent of GDP in 2005), however, as a result of 
the expected effort of most of to fulfill the Maastricht criteria toward EMU entry.
4 
Needles to say, there are wide disparities among the new EU member states. Some of 
the most advanced countries in this group have seen deficit-to-GDP ratios as high as -12.3 per-
cent (Slovakia in 2000), -12.9 percent (Czech Republic in 2003), and -9.3 percent (Hungary in 
2002). On the other hand, there is a group of countries––namely Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
– with only moderate deficits (around -1.8 percent of GDP on average in 2003); and then there 
is Estonia, which has experienced budget surpluses since 2001. These countries also display 
lower debt-to-GDP levels. Estonia had a 5.8 percent ratio in 2003, and the rest of the more 
fiscally responsible new member states did not owe more than 28 percent of GDP in 2003. 
Nevertheless,  seven  out  of  ten  new  member  countries  currently  breach  the  SGP  rules,  and 
the European Commission has launched the excessive deficit procedure against them. 
The disparity among the new EU members, coupled with the disparity of the original old 
member  states,  might  require  more  flexible  interpretation fiscal rules, as already advocated by 
the European Commission under tutelage from some European governments. Nevertheless, this 
increased flexibility comes at the price of lower transparency as discretionary decisions will have 
to be made concerning whether a country is in violation of the limits on deficit or not. Therefore, 
the traditional trade-off between rules and discretion, flexibility and credibility in the working of 
the SGP is extended by the accession of the ten new countries to European Union. 
4. Rationale for Fiscal Rules  
Given the apparent failure of fiscal policy to maintain fiscal stability, we propose as 
an alternative a rule-based system whereby fiscal policy would be subject to an external limit. 
While the variable at which this limit is imposed might vary (annual deficit, total debt, cyclically 
adjusted deficit, etc.) the rule would inevitably limit the freedom of policy makers and limit 
politicians’ reign. This makes fiscal rules controversial. What government would like to be sub-
ject to an external rule? As the row about Germany’s and France’s breach of the SGP vividly il-
lustrates, politicians scorn any external authority that can impose jurisdiction over their tendency 
to set budget deficits according to their (rather short-term) goals. 
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And still, were not central governments similarly beleaguered some twenty years ago, 
when  monetary  policy  was  taken  from  them  and  vested  in  independent  central  banks?  As 
politicians, especially in Europe, were not trusted to run prudent monetary policy, the power to 
set interest rates and intervene in currency markets was widely transferred to a non-elected, 
technocratic institution, with some oversight from parliaments. This transfer has proved to be 
successful, as independent central banks have run monetary policy in a less myopic and more 
sustainable manner than did politicians. 
Why should fiscal policy be any different? Certainly, fiscal decisions lie at the heart of 
many government policies.
5 Politicians often win or lose elections on their pledges to increase 
spending for particular programs or to introduce tax preferences. Inefficient as it often is, this 
political process should not be eliminated. Government will always have the ultimate authority 
to set taxes and spend revenues. However, this authority need not be limitless. As we show 
below, it may be perfectly compatible with democracy for governments to accept overall limits 
on spending and set its structure according to political preference. Or governments may be told 
only what a deficit (or surplus) must be and then decide on the amounts to rise through taxes or 
to spend on various expenditure programs. Such a mechanism would let governments redis-
tribute such as they see fit, and would allow them to normally finance expenditures programs, 
such as defense, health, etc. It would, however, expose governments to hard budget constraints. 
Indeed, even now many countries pursue different fiscal institutional arrangements that 
limit governments’ flexibility.
6 The United States uses nominal caps on discretionary spending, 
while Britain uses the “golden rule” (borrowing only to finance investment). Perhaps most fa-
mously, the European Union has adopted the SGP, which places limits on national budget defi-
cits and debts and assigns penalties to countries that exceed those limits. 
The main objective of such arrangements is to reinforce the credibility and predictability 
of macroeconomic policies. In other words, fiscal rules are usually aimed at mitigating a go-
vernment’s tendency to abandon previous policy commitments. Thus fiscal rules are particularly 
helpful if a government is not able to persuade economic actors that it will conduct a prudent 
fiscal policy. 
Fiscal  rules  are  sometimes  criticized  for  being  redundant,  for  representing  an  un-
necessary bureaucratic obstacle, or for being conducive to misuse via “creative accounting.” How-
ever, even as an imperfect tool, fiscal rules can play a positive role. They introduce a long-term 
horizon to government’s often-shortsighted decision making. Fiscal rules also provide a more 
transparent  information  to  financial  markets,  the  ultimate  source  of  fiscal  discipline  for go-
vernments,  as  strict  transparency  requirements  are  identified  as  a common  denominator  of 
efficient rules.
7 Without such a guide, financial markets react to a change in fundamentals with 
a considerable time lag and they impose high costs (sudden capital outflow, a high-risk pre-
mium) on the government that departs from prudent fiscal policy. 
In order to guide fiscal policy successfully, fiscal rules should be forward-oriented and 
should incorporate increasing pension entitlements stemming from aging populations.
8 Fiscal 
rules should also encompass various quasi-fiscal transfers and programs that are used to mask 
the true size and effects of fiscal policy. Some authors also argue that fiscal-policy rules should 
take  into  account  the  uncertain  character  of  fiscal  revenues  and  expenditures  and use more 
sophisticated financial methods to estimate the “value at risk” of a fiscal policy.
9 
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5. The Stability and Growth Pact and Its Failures 
The  EU  has  implemented  an  ambitious  system  of  fiscal  rules  that  is  intended  to prevent 
excessive  deficits  (and,  eventually,  debts)  among  euro-zone  countries.  The  system  –  the  afore-
mentioned stability and growth pact – goes much further than the EU’s 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which 
created the monetary union and set five basic conditions for membership. Two of these conditions 
constrained the fiscal policy of prospective EMU members as members are forbidden to run deficits 
greater than 3 percent of GDP, and debt should be maintained below 60 percent of GDP. As the EMU 
was established, the debt condition – manifestly unachievable for profligate borrowers such as Italy, 
Belgium or Greece – was scaled down. Instead, the SGP concentrated on annual deficits. Three new 
aspects of fiscal policy were mandated by the SGP: 
• EMU members are to endeavor to achieve a balanced or a surplus budget in order that they 
have enough leeway in the event of cyclical downturns; 
• EMU member countries are to submit annual programs specifying medium-term budgetary 
objectives; 
• if an EMU member country runs a budget deficit exceeding 3 percent of GDP, pena-lization 
will follow; a country can be exempted from the obligation to pay a deposit (which can become a fine) if 
it suffers from annual GDP decline of more than 0.75 percent, and is exempted from the obligation if 
a cyclical downturn of more than 2 percent occurs. 
While  these  three  conditions  are  not  unreasonable,  they  have  failed  to  prevent  lax  fiscal 
policies in the EMU. In fact, member countries’ fiscal deficits quickly deteriorated when the euro-zone 
entered a cyclical slowdown after 2000. The SGP was formally suspended in 2003 after Germany and 
France made a compromise with eurozone finance ministers not to fine them for breaching Maastricht 
criteria on budget deficit for three years in a row.
10 In this chapter, we concentrate on three aspects of 
the SGP that make the pact unlikely for a fiscal-rule application. We will namely argue that: (i) SGP 
rules complicate the free operation of automatic stabilizers, (ii) they do not take into account the un-
funded liabilities of governmental programs, and (iii) they do not lead governments to behave in 
a forward-looking manner. 
5.1  SGP Rules Complicate the Free Operation of Automatic Stabilizers 
European governments tended to conduct pro-cyclical fiscal policies in the years before EMU 
membership (Buti, Franco, Ongena, 1997), and the deficit bias did not disappear after 1999 as the SGP is 
not supported by an efficient enforcement mechanism. Consequently, the deficit rule (if enforced) be-
comes a binding constraint for the operation of automatic stabilizers. As predicted by Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (1998, p. 69), “the Stability Pact will grow more binding […] increasing the volatility of 
output, further depressing growth, and making the provisions of the pact even more binding than 
before.  Through  the  operation  of  this  vicious  spiral,  Europe  could  be  condemned  to  a  low-level 
equilibrium trap.” 
Recurrent  fiscal  tightening  in  low-growth  periods  can  have  adverse  effects  on  long-term 
growth prospects. It can lead to under-investment in both human capital and physical capital and 
a failure to maintain it. The use of automatic stabilizers requires some caution. Automatic stabilizers 
should operate symmetrically over the business cycle rather than being undermined by discretionary 
expenditures in boom periods (van den Noord, 2002). 
5.2 The SGP Rules do Not Take into Account Unfunded Liabilities 
Neither the SGP rules nor their pre-EMU counterpart, the Maastricht criteria, take into ac-
count the unfunded liabilities of governmental programs.
11 They tackle explicit deficits and debts 
only. Explicit government debt can be a good approximation of total governmental liability. However, 
as politicians replace budgetary outlays with promises, with fulfillment costs to be borne by future 
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taxpayers, the explicit debts provide only partial picture. Indeed, the net present value of the im-
plicit debt of public pension systems (based on unchanged policies; for details, see (ABN Amro, 




TABLE 1  Public Pension Debt (% of GDP) 
(net present value of the public pensions debt to 2050, based on unchanged policies) 
 
Austria  223  Italy  230 
Belgium  296  Luxembourg  199 
Denmark  264  Netherlands    85 
Finland  327  Portugal  327 
France  332  Spain  665 
Germany  188  Sweden   201 
Greece  698  UK    14 
Ireland  150  Czech Republic  200–250* 
 
Note: * Estimate (Schneider, 1999) 
Source: ABN AMRO, “Desire to retire: The European Pension Problem,” report, 2003. 
 
Moreover, the EMU rules do not account for off-budget liabilities, which have encou-
raged governmental manipulation with budgetary figures. We believe that the low transparency 
of governmental fiscal policy and the replacement of budgetary outlays with the off-budgetary 
ones will not support European growth prospects, either. Though the risk premiums on high- 
-debt EMU countries are low (Portes, 2003), a publication of the ratings agency Standard and 
Poor’s (2002) clearly shows that implicit pension debt is likely to heavily influence the credit 
ratings (and subsequently, the borrowing costs) of European countries.
13 
5.3  EMU Rules Are Backward-Looking 
EMU rules concentrate on short- and medium-term targets. They thus divert the atten-
tion  and  effort  of  politicians  away  from  not  only  much  needed  reform  of  the  labor  market 
(Eichengreen,  Wyplosz,  1998),  but  also  away  from  pension  reform. The situation is further 
worsened  by  the  non-enforcement  of  the  medium  balance  rule  in  the  early  years  of  EMU. 
Beetsma and Debrun (2003) show, in a simple model framework, that EMU rules discourage 
structural reform. In their words, EMU rules are “sacrificing future growth for present stability”. 
The European Commission modified its stance on SGP in 2002 in two ways. First, it 
switched to cyclically adjusted budget deficits as the key variable used to assess the soundness 
of the fiscal stance of individual countries. This should ease pressure on those EMU members 
that suffer from prolonged stagnation. Second, the Commission signaled that countries which 
progress substantially in structural reforms will be treated “softer”. While most economists agree 
with the Commission’s stance, it is very difficult to measure a variable like an “effort to conduct 
structural reform.” 
The Commission suggested, in a summer 2004 communication, that the SGP should be 
maintained, but significantly revised. Namely, it advocated a shift of focus from annual deficits 
to “debt sustainability.” It suggested a return to the debt criterion that was originally a part of 
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Hopefully, a unified approach to the assessment of implicit pension debt and to the treatment of pension 
schemes in macroeconomic statistics in general, which is being prepared by a working group of actuaries 
established by the IMF statistics department, will spur research into this field. The first larger and inter-
nationally comparable study has been written by Holzmann et al. (2004). They counted the implicit pension 
debts of 35 low- and middle-income countries. 
13 Also, a summer 2004 downgrade of the Italian debt indicates that rating agencies can, if still imperfectly, 
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the Maastricht criteria but was omitted in the SGP. The Commission suggested that the SGP 
should clarify the “satisfactory pace” of debt reduction, and it even hinted that unfunded pension 
obligations and contingent liabilities should be taken into account. 
While  the  Commission  has  proposed  certain  changes  to  the  SGP  (such  as  “more 
country-specific circumstances” or “prolonged periods of sluggish growth”), EU financial mi-
nisters (Ecofin), at their meeting in September 2004, dismissed the Commission’s proposal.
14 
The Ecofin council reiterated that the 3-percent-deficit and the 60-percent-debt criteria are of 
“paramount importance.” It did pledge, however, to take debt sustainability into greater account, 
including “the future costs of aging.” 
Thus, while the SGP formally remains in place, the European Union is currently without 
a binding fiscal rule, and its current expansion to 25 members makes the need for precise fiscal 
rules more urgent. 
6. Do financial Markets Punish Unsustainable Fiscal Policy? 
Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  interplay  between  fiscal  policy  and  financial 
markets’ assessment of government debt. Moreover, we are interested in fiscal policy within a mo-
netary union, as one country’s irresponsible fiscal policy might pose extra costs for others in 
the union. High public debt in one country could raise union-wide interest rates, either through 
a crowding-out or risk-premium effect, exerting a negative externality on other members. If this 
in fact were to happen, there might then be a need for common rules or a special institution 
which would ensure that all the member states behave responsibly in fiscal matters. 
This  idea  of  a  special  institution  is  based  on  the  implicit  assumption  that  financial 
markets are not able to fully differentiate between countries with high and low public debts 
within a monetary union. In fact, it is based on the idea that financial markets base their required 
risk premium on the debt level of the most indebted country. We investigate this assumption 
below. 
As Goldstein and Woglom (1992) and Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1995) note, 
there are generally three approaches to fiscal discipline within monetary unions. The first, as 
stressed in the 1989 Delors Report calls for strict fiscal rules as a means to constrain national 
governments. The second approach, proposed by the European Commission (1990a, 1990b), 
calls for external fiscal rules in the form of multilateral surveillance and peer pressure. The third 
approach, market-based fiscal discipline, is based on the idea that financial markets are able, 
willing, and informed enough to be able to credit-constrain irresponsible governments. 
For this approach to work, there are four additional conditions, namely (i) capital must 
be able to move freely, (ii) full information must be available to sovereign borrowers, (iii) fi-
nancial markets must be convinced that there are no implicit and explicit guaranties on govern-
ment debt and that it will not be monetized, and (iv) the financial system must be strong enough 
to withstand a default of a large borrower. We believe there is a high probability that the EU’s 
financial market does largely fulfill these conditions. It is, of course, questionable as to how 
the EU’s financial market would withstand the default of France or Germany, but it is probably 
able enough to cope with the default of any other member state. 
6.1 Survey of Relevant Literature 
There have been several studies that have analyzed the market-based-discipline hypo-
thesis and financial markets’ capability to punish/reward fiscal policies. Financial markets may 
either ignore a government’s debt level or charge higher interest rates if a government runs 
excessive deficits. The relationship between debt and interest rates might be either linear (in 
which  interest  rates  rise  proportionally  with  the  amount  of  debt)  or  exponential  (in  which 
                                                            
14  See  “Elements  for  strengthening,  clarifying  and  better  implementation  of  the  SGP,”  Ecofin  com-
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interest rates rise rapidly relative to debt); the latter we refer to as the non-linear relationship. In 
the first case, fiscal responsibility rests on the assumption that rising costs of additional debt 
discourage credit-demanding politicians. In the case of non-linear relationship, credit-demand-
ing  politicians might eventually be denied access to additional credit. As we are concerned 
mostly with the monetary-union framework, the literature on monetary-union fiscal policy is 
the most relevant to our research. 
Some  basic  findings  of  recent  empirical  literature  on  the  market-based-discipline 
hypothesis are described in Table 2. The second column of the table refers to the countries and 
the time period under consideration, and the third and fourth columns describe the findings of 
respective studies’ preferred specifications concerning linear and non-linear relationships be-
tween interest rates on government debt and relevant GDP/GSP ratio. The fifth column de-
scribes whether the respective studies estimated the impact of fiscal rules (when applicable, 
appropriate fiscal rules have in general been found to decrease the borrowing costs of govern-
ments).  The  sixth  column  simply  states  whether  the  respective  study  was  concerned  with 
market-based discipline within a monetary union or federation.
15 
Some  evidence  of  market-based  fiscal  discipline  was  identified  in  the  empirical 
literature we surveyed. Nevertheless, whether financial markets are able to induce sufficient 
discipline in governments remains unclear, if not unlikely. There seems to be evidence that 
financial markets require higher default premiums for countries or states (even within fede-
rations and monetary unions) with high debt-to-GDP/GSP ratios. On the other hand, evidence 
that governments might eventually become credit constrained is rather mixed. Therefore, fiscal 
discipline  then  rests  on  the  assumption  that  politicians,  facing  increasing  borrowing  costs, 
pursue alternative policies in order to avoid further borrowing. We doubt that this assumption is 
relevant, and to argue that there would be no need for fiscal rules within monetary union would 
be, by our opinion, rather naive. 
6.2 Empirical Investigation of Market-Based Discipline  
Besides surveying the literature, we tested the hypothesis of market-based fiscal discipline 
ourselves. We sought an existing monetary union with a sustained history, and for which relevant 
and accurate data are available. Therefore, we examined data from the United States. 
There are, surely, differences between the United States and the European Union with 
respect to the market-based-discipline hypothesis. First, the United States is a fiscal federation in 
which the federal budget ensures income-variation smoothening. Although original estimates of 
the extent of such smoothing in the United States by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) and by 
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) were revised by Fatás (1998), it seems reasonable to expect that 
the EU is less federalized than the United States. Therefore, European economies might be less 
synchronized than U.S. states which offers some rationale for the imposition of fiscal rules in 
the EU. 
Second, the number of countries involved in the EMU is much lower than the number of 
states in the American federation. Therefore, financial markets might expect an individual EU 
country to have greater weight within the EMU, i.e., financial markets might expect a higher 
probability of bail-out in EMU than in the United States, which renders market-based discipline 
ineffective, and which might offer an additional rationale for the imposition of some form of 
fiscal rule. 
Third, another feature of federal government in the United States is that there is a certain 
degree of automatic fiscal smoothening, regardless of individual state involvement. On the other 
hand, there is no international fiscal redistribution within the European Union, so differences in 
the business cycle within the EU have a greater impact on the public budget balance than they 
                                                            
15 We believe that federated states offer a very close approximation of monetary unions, and, therefore, that 
the findings concerned with the behavior of relevant variables within federal nation states should offer clues 
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would in the United States. Thus, European countries may find useful a fiscal rule that compels 
individual country’s to coordinate their fiscal-policy stances, at least partially. 
 
TABLE 2  Empirical Findings of Recent Literature on Market-Based-Discipline Hypothesis 
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6.3 Model 
Our hypothesis is that the risk premium required by financial markets is positively cor-
related with the level of public debt in individual U.S. states. We thus investigate the hypothesis 
that financial markets are rewarding fiscally responsible U.S. states with increased access to fi-
nancial resources at lower costs. 
However, we would like to isolate the effect of rising public debt levels on the risk 
premium required by financial markets from other sources of variations, such as the economic 
cycle, variations in the yields of other investment instruments or special provisions, and the limi-
tations of individual American states with respect to their spending and taxing powers. 
We  use  the  following  model,  which  captures  the  major  factors  that  influence  the 
borrowing costs of U.S. states. 
, 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,
INT INF GSP UN DEBT TRANFS i t i t i t i t i t i t
SPE REV SUP FED i t i t i t t i t
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +  
In the equation, we estimate coefficients for two different dependent variables. Our first depen-
dent variable, INT(1)i,t, in the ideal case would be the interest rate governments of U.S. states 
would have to pay on their debt. However, as Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1995), and 
Poterba and Rueben (1999) have noted, such data are not easily obtainable, and for several 
reasons.  First,  there  is limited trading in most state bond issues. Second, state bonds differ 
widely in their call provisions and in other detailed provisions. Third, many state bonds are sold 
in bundles, making it difficult to estimate the yield to maturity on a single issue. 
We deal with this problem in a rather simple way. With data on state expenditures on 
interest payments and overall state debt, we calculated the ratio of the two. This ratio roughly 
measures the cost each state (denoted by subscript i) has to pay on each dollar of debt in a given 
year (denoted by subscript t). 
Our second dependent variable, INT(2)i,t, comes from the Chubb Relative Value Study.
16 
The Chubb Corporation, a U.S. insurance company based in New Jersey, has since 1973 con-
ducted a semi-annual survey among municipal bond traders who are asked to give the yield on 
5-, 10-, and 20-year maturity general obligation bonds for 39 American states relative to New 
Jersey. Data from this survey helps to overcome the problem of the direct comparability of 
yields on the general obligation bonds of different states since they refer to a hypothetical bond, 
and therefore differences in yields should reflect the different position and credit-worthiness of 
individual American states, not the special provisions concerning their bonds. Since the survey 
is conducted semi-annually, we average the data for each year to comply with the rest of our 
data set, which comprises annual data. 
Some important differences between our two dependent variables are worth mentioning. 
Our first dependent variable, interest payments over debt ratio is rather a measure of past de-
cisions, past development of borrowing, and reflects the fact that government revenues fall be-
hind expenditures. Data from the Chubb survey, on the other hand, captures the credit-worthi-
ness of each state government as a borrower, market valuations of state willingness and ability 
to raise revenues in order to repay debt, and market valuations of state ability to cope with un-
predictable events. 
Our set of independent variables includes: a state-specific intercept, αi; the nation-wide 
change of the consumer price index (to capture a notion of expectations based on past expe-
rience, inflation is lagged by one year in our specification), INFt; the percentage growth of pro-
duct of a given state in a given year, GSPi,t; the unemployment rate in a given state and year, 
UNi,t,  public  debt  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  GSP  in  a  given  state  and  year,  DEBTi,t; 
the amount of transfers from the federal government to the given state expressed as a percentage 
                                                            
16 The same data were used by Goldstein and Woglom (1992), Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1995) and 
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of its expenditure in a given year, TRANSFi,t; three dummy variables, which take on value of 1 if 
a given state in a given year had a special provision limiting expenditures, SPEi,t, revenues, REVi,t, 
or  enact  new  taxes,  SUPi,t;  and  the  yield  on  federal  ten-year  constant-maturity  securities  in 
a given year, FEDt. 
The sign and value of β4 determines whether the market-discipline hypothesis is valid or 
not. In the event that β4 = 0, financial markets are not able to discriminate between fiscally 
prudent and irresponsible governments. Conversely, when β4 > 0, financial markets do punish 
those government that borrow heavily. 
6.4 Results 
We were able to obtain data for all 50 American states from 1978 through 2000 for our 
first dependent variable, and data for 39 American states from 1991 through 2000 for our second 
dependent  variable.  The  main  data  source  was  the  Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Census; data about interest rates on federal securities came 
from the Federal Reserve Board; and information about spending and taxing limits come from 
Poterba and Rueben (1999) and ACIR (1995). 
All the data are in a logarithmic form (except for dummy variables) so that the estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. We estimated the relevant coefficients using panel- 
-data procedure and report the results in the Table 3.  
Inflation, captured by the coefficient β1, has a non-monotical influence on government 
bond yields – notice the difference between the coefficient for inflation for the first and second 
dependent variable. Our first dependent variable, as already mentioned, is rather a past-oriented 
concept, and therefore the negative coefficient captures an inflation-tax phenomenon whereby 
expected inflation increases nominal yields, as financial markets require stable real yields. On 
the other hand, positive coefficient estimates, based on financial-market data, a future-oriented 
concept, capture the attempt of lenders to secure their real interest rates. In other words, un-
expected inflation erases a part of the past obligations, i.e., it is an implicit tax. 
As one might expect, β2 has a positive and β3 a negative sign since favorable economic 
development lowers the borrowing costs of governments. 
The sign and value of β4 determines whether the market-discipline hypothesis is valid or 
not. If β4 were non-significant, financial markets would not be able to discriminate between fis-
cally prudent and irresponsible governments. But β4 is positive, which means that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis. The model yields the same magnitude of estimated variable for the debt- 
-to-GSP ratio, and basically the same significance level across the specifications. Nevertheless, 
the coefficient β4 is relatively low compared to other coefficients of significant variables. 
A few other things ought to be mentioned. First, notice in Table 3 the difference be-
tween the coefficient for inflation for the first and second dependent variable. We interpret this 
given that our first dependent variable, as previously mentioned, is rather a past-oriented con-
cept, and therefore the negative coefficient captures inflation tax. On the other hand, positive 
coefficient estimates, based on financial-market data, a future-oriented concept, captures the at-
tempt of lenders to secure their real interest rates. 
Second, notice that for our first dependent variable, an estimated coefficient for a dummy 
variable  describing  the  limitation  of  government  to  enact  new  taxes,  is  highly  insignificant 
(therefore, we excluded it in the second column, and, in the third column, we excluded all 
remaining insignificant variables). This is consistent with the positive coefficient for revenue 
limitations,  which  yield  higher  debt-servicing  costs  simply  because  governments,  instead  of 
being able to raise relevant revenues, resort to the debt financing of their activities. 
This brings us to the third point. Notice that the dummy variable for revenue limitations 
is  insignificant  in  the  model  with  market-survey  data.  This  is  consistent  with  the  idea  that 
financial markets are not concerned with governments’ overall limitations on revenue, but that 
they are concerned with their ability to raise additional revenue through new taxes. AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  44
TABLE 3  Test of the Market-Discipline Hypothesis 
Coefficient  First dependent variable, INT(1)i,t  Second dependent variable, 
INT(2)i,t  
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2  0.31  0.31  0.30  0.85  0.85  0.85 
Number of observations  1100  1100  1100  390  390  390 
 
Notes: Data span from 1978 through 2000 for first dependent variable and from 1991 through 2000 for se-
cond dependent variable. Values of heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Both 
models  estimated  by  fixed  effect  procedure  (unambiguously  suggested  for  INT(1)  variable  by 
Hausman test and not yielding significantly different results for INT(2) variable). 
 
And lastly, notice the difference in significance in the coefficient for transfers from the fe-
deral government. Significant estimates for our first dependent variable reveal that higher fede-
ral transfers allow state governments to rely less on debt financing; nevertheless, this is not 
taken in account by financial markets, which are concerned primarily with governments’ ability 
to find additional funds for debt repayment. 
6.5 Correlation of Debt Ratio with State Ratings 
There is another way how to test the hypothesis whether markets are or are not able to 
distinguish responsible from irresponsible governments. We collected the credit ratings of indi-
vidual American states from 1995 through 2002 as conducted by major rating agencies and cal-
culated its correlation with a fiscal variable of our concern – the debt-to-GSP ratio of individual 
states.
17 
Clearly, there is a relation between the rating of an individual state and its debt-to-GSP 
ratio. This is consistent with Standard and Poor’s (2004), who state that debt-to-GSP ratio of 
                                                            
17 Since ratings are reported in letterform, we translated them into numerical values. A higher number means 
a lower rating. We did not perform regression analysis since credit ratings take on seven different values 
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individual states is among the criteria which determine the ratings for each state. Since credit 
ratings in many cases serve as the primary source of information many lenders acquire about 
their perspective investment, it is clear that debt-to-GSP ratio, through rating agencies, is posi-
tively correlated with the borrowing costs any state must face. 
 
TABLE 4  Correlation of State Debt (expressed as % of GSP) with State Rating 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Standard & Poor’s  0.23  0.31  0.30  0.37  0.39  0.37  0.30  0.17 
Moody’s  0.39  0.44  0.44  0.45  0.34  0.32  0.24  0.22 
Fitch  0.36  0.39  0.39  0.40  0.32  0.31  0.18  0.19 
 
Notes:   The average number of rated states was 42 by Standard & Poor’s, 40 by Moody’s, and 33 by Fitch. 
The correlation is a rating with a one-year lagged debt-to-GSP ratio. The test statistics for the hypo-
thesis of independence ranges, depending on the number of rated states, from 0.29 to 0.38 at a 5-per-
cent significance level. 
 
But the correlation has lessened in the past few years. Although we do not have an expla-
nation  for  such  a  development,  the  result  is  that  rating  agencies  seem  to  be  decreasingly 
concerned about the debt-to-GSP ratio of American states. On the one hand, this could be the re-
sult of U.S.-specific events, which is not relevant for a discussion of fiscal rules at the European 
level. On the other hand, if the lower correlation reflects a weaker link between debt level and 
market apprehension, it provides another argument for increasing the role of an institutional 
fiscal rule – as discussed in detail later on. 
7. Internal and External Externality 
In this place, it is relevant to distinguish between external externality from borrowing 
and internal externality from borrowing. External externality from borrowing refers to the exter-
nality  irresponsible  government places on other states of monetary union or in a federation 
through its increasing indebtedness. The literature and our own findings suggest that financial 
markets are able to internalize this effect and punish irresponsible behavior, at least temporarily. 
Internal externality refers to the possible impact that excessive borrowing might pose on 
future generations in a given country. However, higher debt levels over the past several decades, 
in spite of the globalization of capital markets and increased financial liberalization, suggests 
that this sort of externality is not being internalized by financial markets. 
In other words, the external externality may be interpreted as a form of interregional 
redistribution, while internal externality might be considered as a form of intergenerational re-
distribution. Growing debt levels, i.e., increasing intergenerational redistribution, might offer 
a reasonable rationale for the imposition of an appropriate fiscal rule that would compel poli-
ticians to take in account the interests of future generations. 
Another  rationale  for  the  imposition  of  fiscal  rules  is  that  financial  markets  tend  to 
overreact. The series of financial crises that took place over the last two decades offers a clear 
example. Despite that macroeconomic stabilization might be effected relatively quickly, the con-
fidence of financial markets might take longer to restore. Therefore, fiscal rules might serve as 
a prevention that ensures that governments limit their borrowing well before their debt reaches 
critical levels. 
There  are  two  additional  channels  through  which  the  irresponsible  behavior  of  one 
country might impose extra costs on other countries within a monetary union. The first channel 
came to be known in the economic literature as the crowding-out effect. The high debt level of 
one country might raise, ceteris paribus, interest rates for other countries. Recent findings of 
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crowding-out takes place. The second channel- the contagion effect- refers to the default of one 
country within a monetary union or federation which might temporarily rise interest rates for 
others, i.e., contagion occurs. However, as Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) show, a contagion 
effect by itself does not offer a sufficient rationale for the imposition of fiscal rules. 
We can summarize the hitherto discussion as follows: (i) financial markets are able to 
distinguish between fiscally responsible and irresponsible governments; (ii) nevertheless, we 
doubt that financial markets might solve all the problems associated with fiscal policy, espe-
cially  as  they  seem  unable  to  solve  the  intergenerational  redistribution  (internal  externality) 
aspect of the fiscal-policy problem; (iii) further, financial markets, when it comes to reaction, 
usually punish fiscal irresponsibility in a harsh way; and (iv) financial markets seem to reward 
countries with sound fiscal rules with lower default premiums – thus, fiscal rules lower the costs 
associated with governmental debt. 
8. Sustainability Council 
As  the  discussion  above  illustrates,  it  is  not  easy  to  define  a  robust,  efficient,  and 
incentive-compatible fiscal rule. Indeed, we have seen how the SGP fails many tests that a good 
fiscal rule must pass. In this chapter, we endeavor to propose a fiscal rule that, according to us, 
would better suit the EU’s needs and that would be more robust vis-à-vis political pressure.
18 
We suggest creating a Fiscal Sustainability Council (FSC), which would better cope 
with the inherited weaknesses of the SGP. We do not suggest that any institution – whether a SGP 
or a FSC––would be able to solve the bias of national governments to excessive deficits. We, 
however, do believe that a properly structured institution may increase the incentives for poli-
ticians to run more responsible fiscal policy. 
As noted above, one of the main shortcomings of the SGP is its low credibility and its 
dual character: a country is either in compliance with the SGP or it was threatened by its ex-
cessive deficit procedure, despite that the difference in fiscal policy in these two cases might be 
minimal. This duality made the SGP unlikely to be applied, as it does not provide incentives for 
good behavior and its penalties are too extreme. 
At the same time, we showed that an international-based fiscal rule is more likely to 
succeed than purely national ones because fiscal policy has an internal-externality aspect, which 
often leads to excessive deficits. As national politicians find it very difficult to establish a cre-
dible  and  long-standing  fiscal-rule  framework,  we  believe  that  an  international  institution, 
namely the EU, offers the best chance for success. If a fiscal rule is embedded in the legislation of 
a supranational body, such as the EU, it becomes less vulnerable vis-à-vis nationalistic pressure.
19 
As the sad example of the SGP clearly illustrates, credibility and institutional factors are 
far more important than numerical targets. The SGP failed not because of its “stupidity” but 
because it was vulnerable to purely political decisions and was not incentive compatible. 
Thus, a more fundamental anchoring of fiscal rules, at least in Europe, is needed. We 
believe  that  an  independent  Fiscal  Sustainability  Council,  broadly  in  line  with  Wyplosz’s 
proposal (2005), might be the most appropriate candidate. We, however, would complement this 
in several aspects. First, we stress the forward-looking nature of our fiscal rule. Second, we 
stress the sustainability of fiscal policies, and, therefore, are concerned with total public debt, 
                                                            
18 As we are primarily concerned with sustainability, it would seem appropriate to define it somehow. 
Unfortunately, there is no generally agreed on definition of sustainability. Moreover, the literature on this 
issue is divided into two streams. First, discussing the sustainability of past policies, and second, discussing 
the future development of fiscal policies and their sustainability, especially in the light of population ageing. 
If any definition of sustainability should be given, we would tend to support a rather general definition 
which treats sustainability as a condition in which all current policies can be sustained over long periods of 
time without urgent need for correction. 
19 The 2003 decision of the Ecofin Council to place the SGP in abeyance does indicate, though, that even 
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which  we  define  as  the  sum  of  explicit  and  implicit  public  debt.
20  Third,  we  believe  that 
the greater the emphasis fiscal rule puts on structural reforms the better. Fourth, we rely on 
financial markets to punish irresponsible governments and therefore consider the FSC’s role to 
consist primarily of providing reliable, trustworthy, and internationally comparable data and 
information to agents on financial markets. In other words, we believe that the FSC would 
ensure that the above-mentioned conditions for market-based discipline would be fulfilled. 
And fifth, we differ from Wyplosz in the respect that we put much less emphasis on the peer 
pressure of other states as an effective, coercive force, as we believe that has proved inade-
quate in the past. 
8.1 Council Setup 
The FSC’s first task would be to estimate the amount of implicit debt in each country 
stemming from obligations future governments will have to deal with as regards demographic 
ageing. The sum of this implicit debt, and the amount of explicit public debt in each country, is 
what we call total debt (as % of GDP), which would be FSC’s variable of interest. 
A second task would be to decide to what level total debt is to be reduced, along with 
a decision about the timing of the reduction. The FSC could adjust the targeted level to the latest 
(i.e., more precise) estimates of demographic indicators. In our example, we have chosen the tar-
geted level of total debt to be 100 percent of GDP, and the time in which the reduction is to be 
completed at 45 years. While a 100-percent benchmark might seem totally arbitrary, the 45-year 
time frame has been chosen based on current demographic predictions that imply that impact of 
population ageing will culminate (from a public-finance point of view) approximately in the year 
2050. 
The FSC would subsequently calculate the rate of debt reduction solving following equation: 
                                         ( ) 1 D D D T t t t α = − ⋅ − +                              (1) 
where Dt stands for total debt-to-GDP ratio at time t, T stands for the targeted level of total debt 
to GDP, and α for the rate of debt reduction. The following picture shows the trajectory for three 
different countries, starting from a level of total debt-to-GDP ratio at 200, 300, and 500 percent of 
GDP respectively, with α chosen such that in the next 45 years, total debt declines to 100 per-
cent of GDP (for three different countries this implies α to equal 0.07, 0.09, and 0.10). 
 

































                                                            
20  Implicit  debt  refers  to  the  financial  resources  any  government  will  need  in  the  future  to  fulfill  its 
obligations to its citizens. Therefore, what we understand by the term is the discounted sum of future 
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The FSC would set a trajectory for each country according to initial level of total debt, 
which would subsequently serve as the measure of the government’s success in reducing the total 
debt. The initial estimation of level of implicit debt would likely be the most complicated part of 
the procedure since there is no unified and widely accepted methodology. However, much work 
and effort has been put into the research connected with this issue, especially since the process 
of multilateral surveillance under the SGP also made explicit the need for a unified methodology 
toward the estimation of implicit debt. 
After the initial decision is made about time and rate of total debt reduction, and after 
the necessary search is made for an optimal methodology for assessing implicit debt, the FSC’s 
prime role would be to publish reliable data about how each country is faring with respect to 
the sustainability of its public finances. Figure 2 helps illustrate the idea. 
 


































Figure 2 shows a country starting with a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 120 percent, with 
100 percent being the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio. The baseline trajectory for total debt reduction 
set by FSC is the bold, evenly decreasing line starting at 120 percent of GDP. This trajectory is 
the best solution from the FSC point of view. To maximize the probability that a country follows 
this path, the FSC would recommend a budgetary balance on an annual basis. 
Due to unexpected events, and due to errors in making predictions or due to cyclical 
movement in business activity, it is more likely that actual movement would follow the tra-
jectory that fluctuates around our baseline scenario. But even this “second-best” development 
leads to the same result in the long term – see the dashed line. 
The lower part of the chart illustrates the advantage of focusing on total debt rather than 
on explicit debt only. The evenly decreasing lower line is the trajectory of the reduction of the ex-
plicit debt based on our best scenario, i.e., our baseline trajectory of total debt. In this exercise, 
we assume that the implicit debt level remains constant and that the whole debt reduction comes 
from the explicit debt reduction. 
Consider now that due to worsening of demographic changes, implicit debt grows, and 
that in order to stop this process a government is forced to undertake a structural reform––for 
example, a reform of the pension system. Such a reform temporarily transfers the implicit part of 
total debt into the explicit, but in the end ensures the sustainable development of public finances. 
This temporary shift in the composition of total debt is illustrated by the hump in 
the lower-left part of the chart where the explicit debt increases, but the total debt keeps falling, 
due to a strong elimination of the implicit debt. Since the FSC would not be concerned with 
the level of explicit debt, a government envisaging a structural reform would not be constrained 
by the requirement to not increase the explicit debt level. This is what we believe makes our 
proposal better than the existing SGP: it does not punish governments for measures that ensure 
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8.2 Council inDependence 
The FSC, if it is to work properly, must be independent from regular political-cycle con-
siderations, i.e., it must be shielded from member countries’ national governments. Therefore, 
an appointment system, similar to the one applied to the European Central Bank’s governing 
council,  is  recommended.  We  would  further  recommend  that  the FSC be chaired by senior 
economists selected and appointed by the European Parliament. 
Importantly, the FSC would not interfere with member countries’ routine fiscal- and tax- 
-policy issues. The sole responsibility of the FSC would be to set levels of fiscal deficit for any 
given year with respect to two factors: (a) a member country’s position in the business cycle, 
and (b) a member country’s total indebtedness (including explicit and implicit debt). The FSC 
would announce the targeted deficits (or surpluses) for each member country well in advance, so 
that  the  respective governments could draft their budgets in which they can implement any 
policy preference they choose. The Council would not define levels of revenues or expenditures, 
so a government may reach the deficit target with very different tax revenues and expenditures. 
The policy aspect of fiscal policy would be, thus, maintained. Here, a parallel with central-bank 
independence is evident. 
Long-term fiscal sustainability requires intertemporal budget constraints for the general 
government to be satisfied: 
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where b(t) is the ratio of government debt to GDP, r is interest rate, n is the nominal GDP 
growth, τ is the total government revenues, and g represents total government expenditures. 
However, this seemingly straightforward solution is based on long-term forecasts and is, 
thus, susceptible to governments’ short-term goals. There is one important consideration to be 
made  here.  Most  European  governments  rely  on  the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) principle in fi-
nancing their social-security systems. However, PAYG pension systems are generally unfunded 
(or under-funded) due to rapidly aging populations in Europe, though the debt is thus far im-
plicit. However, this implicit debt represents an estimate of costs that will be faced by future 
taxpayers. It will be either in the form of higher taxes and/or lower pensions, or in the form of 
debt incurred during a reform. 
Any fiscal rule that wants to be forward-looking must thus take into account this implicit 
debt and must include it in its provisions. We argue that this aspect further reinforces the argu-
ment for making fiscal institutions as independent from government as possible, as government 
would undoubtedly attempt to manipulate the implicit debt estimates. 
8.3 Financial Markets as an Arbiter 
The rules and conditions applied above share one major weakness with other proposed 
modifications of the SGP, i.e., a weak enforcement mechanism. Generally, it is very difficult to 
devise a fiscal rule that will be incentive compatible for governments and that will have an em-
bedded enforcement mechanism. As we have shown, the SGP failed largely because of its en-
forcement mechanism, which left decisions on fiscal-policy sustainability in the hands of poli-
ticians. 
For this reason, our proposal incorporates financial markets as an indispensable part of 
the enforcing mechanism. Namely, we suggest that any country that is a euro-zone member or 
becomes a euro-zone candidate vests with the FSC five tranches of its five-year maturity bonds, 
each tranche equaling 3 percent of GDP of the respective country.
21 The FSC would then re- 
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of their acceptance and assessment by financial markets. Currently, there are only two countries in the EU 
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-issue one of these tranches every year, just to maintain a stable stock of bonds of the respective 
country. 
While doing so, the FSC would interact with financial markets and “guide” them as to 
whether the respective country’s fiscal policy is or is not deemed to be sustainable. Thus, a well- 
-run country would receive a positive report from the FSC and, eventually, would enjoy lower 
interest rates on its debt. On the other hand, a country with excessive fiscal deficits would be 
labeled as such by the FSC, and, subsequently, financial markets would assess higher interest 
rates on its debt.  
One  advantage  of  such  a  solution  is  that  financial  markets  will  always  be  here and 
credit-demanding governments will always have to play by market rules. As noted by Berndsen 
(2001), fiscal rules, no matter how carefully designed, usually erode over time and lose their 
effectiveness, bringing back the old problem of irresponsible fiscal behavior. Our proposal does 
not rely on fiscal rule as such. Our proposal calls for the creation of an institution that would be 
able and willing to supply relevant and reliable information about the fiscal stance of individual 
countries to financial markets. 
Second, our proposal works gradually and is free of the above-mentioned duality that 
hampered the SGP. A government gets awarded (or punished) by interest rates on its debt a few 
basic points lower (or higher), and this process takes place regularly, on an annual basis. Thus, 
a well performing country is motivated to maintain its good performance and a fiscally pro-
fligate government is deterred from a further escalation of fiscal deficits by financial markets’ 
regular assessment of its policy. 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper we have demonstrated that fiscal policy has not yet lost its deficit bias. We 
argued that temporal inconsistency, present in all government actions, demonstrates itself in 
fiscal policy as strongly as it used to in monetary policy. We thus argued that the fiscal-policy 
framework should, and could, be changed in a way emulating the separation of monetary policy 
from regular government intrusion. 
We showed that financial markets are indeed able to separate “good” from “bad” fiscal 
policies and punish the latter by assessing higher borrowing costs. However, the potential spill- 
-over effects of a fiscal crisis in a member country do justify some pan-union fiscal institutional 
framework.  We  argued  that  governmental  bias  toward  deficits  might  be  best  contained  by 
vesting deficit decisions with an independent sustainability council. 
We also argued that such council should take into account implicit fiscal debt, not only 
explicit debt. This would better prepare public budgets for a rapid increase in expenditures as 
baby-boomers head for their retirement and will draw public pensions and use public-health- 
-care programs on an unprecedented scale. 
Crucially, we argued that our proposed Fiscal Sustainability Council should be given 
the right to re-issue a constant fraction of a country debt on a regular basis. This would give 
the FSC power and opportunity to guide financial markets and to communicate to them which 
fiscal policies the FSC deems to be sustainable and which not, and, thus, which merit higher 
interest  rates  to  justify  their  higher  risk  of  default.  This  institutional  arrangement  would 
rationally link a fiscal institution (the FSC) with financial markets, and would make the fiscal 
rule less rigid and more market-oriented. 
Fiscal policy has become, as we argued above, a threat to long-term sustainable macro-
economic stability in most developed countries. The current fiscal regimes, where the stabi-
lization role of fiscal policy is mostly vested with elected officials, are flawed, as they lead to 
deficit-biased fiscal policy. It is time to recognize the role of political decision making in fiscal 
                                                                                                                                            
be either spared the procedure, as their debt level is evidently sustainable, or they can be asked to raise 
the debt anyway and would be free to save the money raised. AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  51
policy, and to reconsider which aspects of fiscal policy should be institutionalized and more 
closely wed to financial markets. 
Last but not least, our proposal overcomes the problem with endogenous institutions that 
ensure fiscal responsibility and which presents a serious problem to much of the recent literature 
on fiscal rules. Any proposal for fiscal rule faces the objection that the author imposes a nor-
mative solution, while in fact deficits and rising debt ratios are the result of the will of majority 
of the citizens in a given country. What we say by our proposal for the FSC is that any nation is 
free to run any fiscal policy it desires, as long as his behavior has no externalities on other 
nations. AUCO Czech Economic Review, March 2007, vol.1, no.1  52
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